Abseut-Selfish overlay networks consist of autonomous nodes that develop their own strategies by optimizing towards their local objectives and self-interests, rather than following prescribed protocols. It is thus important to regulate the behavior of selfish nodes, so that system-wide properties are optimized. In this paper, we investigate the problem of bandwidth allocation in overlay networks, and propose to use a market-driven approach to regulate the behavior of selfish nodes that either provide or consume services. In such markets, consumers of services select the best service providers, taking into account both the performance and the price of the service. On the other hand, service providers are encouraged to strategically decide their respective prices in a pricing game, in order to maximize their economic revenues and minimize losses in the long run. In order to overcome the limitations of previous models towards similar objectives, we design a decentralized algorithm that uses reinforcement learning to help selfish nodes to incrementally adapt to the local market, and to make optimized strategic decisions based on past exTeriences. We have simulated our proposed algorithm in randomly generated overlay networks, and have shown that the behavior of selfish nodes converges to their optimal strategies, and resource allocations in the entire overlay are nesr-optimal, and eficiently adapts to the dynamics of overlay networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
When overlay nodes are inherently seljish, applications in overlay networks may not perform optimally, since selfish nodes tend to optimize towards their self-interests. For example. they may attempt to maximally exploit services from other nodes, while not willing to provide services to others. Their strategies and behavior are not easily regulated by prescribed distributed algorithms, if their self-interests are not considcred. Naturally, it is important EO regulate the behavior of such selfish nodes, and even steer such behavior towards the c o w nion good, where system-wide properties are optimized, rather than the original local self-interests. We investigate the problem of bandwidth allocation in overlay networks, involving applications with long-lived and bandwidth demanding peerto-peer data transmissions. We wish to manipulate the selfinterests of overlay nodes by placing all participating nodes in a marker, where service provisioning becomes preferable even for selfish nodes.
Let us consider the relationship between the nodes that provide services and the nodes that consume them. Each overlay node that consumes services. hereafter referred to as a downsfream node. has the choice of using the service from one of multiple nodes that have the capability of providing if (henceforth referred to as zipstream nodes). On the other hand, each upstream node may potentially serve multiple downstream nodes. In the bandwidth allocation problem. we can simply envision that the data source in the peer-to-peer data transfer application provides a "service" to the receiver, who benefits from receiving such data.
Two critical questions arise from this context. First. if we establish a directed overlay link (that symbolically represents the service provisioning relationship) between a successfully matched upstream and downstream node, which overlay links should we include in our service provisioning network, that connects all the upstream nodes that provide services to all the downstream nodes that consume them? Second. once these links are established. how much bandwidth should be assigned to each overlay link in order IO satisfy the traffic demands of as many downstream nodes as possible? The formation of this problem is rather generic, and may find its root in various overlay application scenarios such as overlay multimedia streaming and parallel downloading of bulky data.
By placing all participating (upstream and downstream) nodes in a mar& we can leverage the concept of prices of providing services to regulate the behavior of selfish nodes in contributing and consuming resources required for such services. In our problem of bandwidth allocation, such resource is the network bandwidth. A downstream node simply pays a price to an upstream node for every unit of bandwidth the data transmission service consumes.
Our market model is fundamentally different from most single pricing or sralic yricivlg models that have been previously studied in the context of overlay networks. In previous models, either a single centralized price is used in the entire system, or per-service prices are established, but remain static throughout the lifetime of the nodes. In our market mechanism, each upstream node has its own specific service price it prefers to charge its downsueam nodes, and such a price is dynamically adjusted over time in order to maximize its economic revenue and minimize its empirical, loss (due to the occupation of its bandwidth by downstream nodes) in the long run. Such a market mechanism is more flexible and realistic, as there does not exist centralized authorities to determine a single centralized price in overlay networks.
The market mechanism can be understood from two different perspectives. First, from the perspective of the downstream nodes as service consumers, they need the freedom to select the best upstream nodes h a t not only deliver the best performance, but also incur the minimum economic costs. Second, from the perspective of the upstream nodes in the market, they compete in a pricing game in which they need to strategically decide their service prices, since their future revenues and potential losses are determined by the prices set by all players in the game. Such a pricing game, unfortunately, is rather complex in reality: it is a game with incomplete information and imperfect recall, which usually requires the nodes' supplementary knowledge on probability distributions of missing information in order to be solvable by classical game theory. In this paper. we provide practical solutions For strategic nodes to gradually solve the pricing game, by modeling them as reinforcement learning agents that are capable of incrementally improving their strategies through trial-and-error interactions with the external world.
At equilibrium, nodes are expected to reach strategies that optimally adjust their prices.
In more general scenarios where all overlay nodes may potentially assume the dual roles of being both upsueam and downstream, the proposed market mechanism solves the general problems of downstreamhpstream matching and bandwidth assignment, both in a fully distributed manner. In this paper, we study how well the effects of such a market mechanism approximate the optimal system-wide properties that can be achieved in overlay networks, In particular, given an overlay network, the distribution of data items, and the demands from downstreams, we evaluate the oprimaliy of a specific bandwidth allocation with two metrics: (1) the percentage of transmission requests accepted by the network; and ( 2 ) the total end-to-end throughput in the resulting topology.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We first discuss related work in Sec. 11. The market model is formulated in Sec. HI. Sec. IV defines the pricing game, and discusses our distributed solution based on reinforcement learning algorithms. Bandwidth allocation decisions LO be made by upstream and downstream nodes on the market are discussed in Sec. V. Sec. VI evaluates the performance of the proposed mechanism through simulation results. Finally, Sec. VI1 concludes the paper. Second, if we assume the existence of a senlice charge or reward, a selfish node may be concerned with both the empirical benefit or loss and the economic revenue or cost.
When the service charge and reward are decided by a central authority [6] , [7] , [8] , 193, a selfish node just needs to decide the amount of its contribution or usage of resources, and may not be aware of the behavior of others. If we assume that the central authority makes strategic decisions on prices, the interactions between one player and the other players lead to a Sfactelberg game [IO] . Aldough the existence of any central authorities can not be conveniently assumed in overlay networks, we still believe that it is a promising direction to further explore decentralized algorithms of settling charges and rewards, and to study the interactions between the two sides that charge and pay.
Finally, some recent work has introduced the theory of mechanisiiz design [l 11 to the study of autonomous networks.
The main focus is to exploit the strength of strafegyproof mechanisms, which enforce selfish entities to truthfully reveal their private information by offering calculated payments, in order io derive the optimal solution to a system-wide problem, Initially, various second-price auctions have been extensively studied. For In our study, we assume that each overlay node is capable of measuring performance metrics regarding overlay links between itself and other overlay nodes. WiCh respect to one-hop flows, we assume that nodes are only concerned with session throughput, and the available bandwidth Bj(t) from node i to node j may be measured through bandwidth estimation algorithms at any given time. We assume that essential overlay services such as service discovery exist in the overjay network, so that each downstream node is able 10 identify a set of upstream candidates that are able to provide the requested data before interacting with them on the market. Finally, we assume a secure payment mechanism among peers is in place, which is complementary to this study and has been the focus of some of the existing research work [SI, 1181, L191.
A. Market inode1
Our marker model is established based on the notions of downstream and upstream nodes of one-hop flows. where the downstream node may be interpreted as the buyer and consumer of the data service, and the upstream node as the seller and provider. As a potential upstream node of an onehop flow to be established, each overlay node i maintains a transmission price p i ( t ) for time slot t , which is to be charged to any of its one-hop downstream nodes, for eoch unit of bandwidth they consume in that time slot. pi(C) may be adjusted by node i over time, for the purpose of maximizing its utility based on its accumulated experience.
Each downstream node aims to achieve the highest benefit from the one-hop flows it receives, and minimize the payments made to the respective upstream nodes. Therefore, it selecrs upstream nodes based on their prices, as well as the maximum possible session throughput from each of them. Each downstream node determines the actual session throughputor the amount of bandwidth to be purchased per unit time -by maximizing i t s own utility function. Since traffic loads at both sides and within the underlying network may change over time, downstream nodes have the freedom to switch to better upstream nodes, since it wishes to always enjoy the best performance at the minimum cost. When establishing one-hop flows, we assume that upstream nodes accept any downstream nodes as long as the resulting one-hop flows improve their utilities. In other words, for requests that come in sequentially. an upstream node simply processes them on a jitir-st come first serve basis, withoui skipping or waiting for "better" requests to come.
B. Utili& fiinction
In our market mechanism, the consistent objective of any selfish node is to maximize its self-interest for every time slot that it participates in overlay data transmissions. Mathematically, we may characterize a node's self-interest using a utili? funclion. which includes the empirical benej'its and losses for consuming and contributing bandwidth resources, and the economic revenides and costs incurred in trading the resource.
Since an overlay node usually assumes the dual roles of both downsweam and upstream in the overlay, its utility function includes the utility in both roles. For the time slot t, suppose that node i is currently receiving flows from a set U i ( t ) of upstream nodes, each at a rate of e ( t ) and a unit charge of p j ( t ) , j E Ui(t); it also delivers flows to a set D i ( t ) of downstream nodes, each at rate b i ( t ) . If the local bandwidth capacity at node i is Cii the utility of node i participating in overlay data transmissions can be expressed as:
The first two terms represent node 2's empirical benefit of receiving flows, and b e empirical loss for delivering flows. The third and fourth term represent the economic cost and revenue in the market. As is evident from the log(.)
) infunction, the empirical benefit ~1 log 1 + hi creases quickly from zero as the total receiving throughput increases from zero, then increases more slowly. This reflects the intuition that the initial increase in receiving throughput is more important to a node. On the contrary, the empirical
increases relatively slowly loss € 2 log 1 -c.
from zero at the beginning but rapidly later, which reflects the natural judgement of a selfish node that becomes increasingly reluctant to sell bandwidth when its available capacity is decreasing. The log( .) function is also analytically convenient. since it is increasing. strictly concave and continuously differ- 
C. Decision problems
Nodes have different decisions to make as they appear on the market as downstream and upstream nodes. As a downstream node, since the transmission prices of its upstream candidates are given, the decision problem of node i is to select the best upstream node and the optimal receiving throughput. so that it receives the highest positive utility from the transmission, given the constraints of available bandwidth between itself and the selected upstream node. As an upstream node, node i faces two kinds of decisions, First, for any downstream node that requests for service, node i decides the range of its acceptable outgoing bandwidth, beyond which its utility is going to decrease. Second, node i strategically decides the transmission price it charges in order to maximize its utility in each upcoming time slot.
Why should node i dynamicaIly decide and ad-just its price as an upstream node? Due to the nature of the market model, whether or not node i will be selected by a downstream node depends not only on its transmission price and the performance of the overlay link between the two, but also on the transmission prices set by other upsueam candidates and performance of heir respective overlay links. Therefore, if node 2's transmission price is too high, few downstream nodes may wish to receive flows from it; if it is too low, too much bandwidth may be consumed during the time slot, so that some downstream nodes may decide LO switch to other upstream nodes or to reduce their receiving throughput. due to the degraded performance.
IV. THE PRICING GAME We divide our discussions on the behavior of selfish nodes in the market setting into two parts. In this section, we discuss the decision problem at upstream nodes with respect to their transmission prices. In the subsequent section, we proceed to the probIem of making upstream selections at downstream nodes, when transmission prices are available.
A. Game formulation and ils properties
Since all selfish nodes involved in overlay data transmissions need to decide their transmission prices strategically, they form the player set I , and the pricing game can be formed as follows. Each node i has a set of actions Ai = {ai) to be chosen under various situations, and a strategy set Si = Ifi} containing all the possible mappings from distinguishable information sets {Hi} perceived by node i to node i's actions, i.e., fi : Hi + ai. Asynchronously in time, nodes sequentially take their optimal actions, following their optimal strategies that maximize their utilities as expressed in q. ( 
1).
To reduce the complexity of the game. we assume transmission prices to be integer-wlited, and interpret node i's actions as the possible incremental changes to be made to the prices: Ai = {-l,O, l}. For such a finite game -one with finite number of players and finite action sets for each player, the classical game theory has proved that it has at least one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium [20] .
However Z-l unit represents a delay of one time slot.
The interaction interface between an agent and the environment. The A decision policy is incrementally improved as the agent tries by choosing an optimal action following the current policy, and then makes corrections by adjusting the policy based on the most recent observation ( s ( t -l ) , u(t -l ) , s(f), ~( t ) ) .
For improved efficiency, we adopt the @learning method that improves decision policies with the aid of Q-vulue func- where Q ( s , a ) is the Q-value associated with the state-action pair ( s , a ) , and represents the e-pectecl re'etum when taking action a in state s and then following the current policy to the end. The expected return is expressed as follows:
where y E [O, 1) is a discounring factor that discriminates the impact of reinforcements that are farther away. The standard updating rule for Q-learning is given as: I; is Given all the Q-values of state-action pairs associated with the current state s, the probability of taking action a follows the Bolrzmann distribution given by:
where a is a positive constant that controls the "sharpness" of differentiating actions corresponding to different Q-values.
C. Playing 6s RL
We wish to leverage reinforcement learning methods to solve the decision making problem for the pricing game, based on the following justifications.
- -Third, as the Q-function converges, the agent will form a decision policy that maps an environment state s to a probability distribution P(als) over all possible actions (Eq. (4)), which exactly corresponds to the spirit of a mixed strategy equilibrium in our game.
-FinaIly, the 0~n o -Q learning algorithm is very amenabIe to incremental implementations. Formally, we define the RL-based solution for the pricing game players as follows. A node i, when acting as an upstream node, is represented by a RL agent that locally observes the environment state bi(t) at the end of time slot t, and maintains the inreger-valued transmission price pi(t -t-1) c p i ( t ) + Ap, by choosing actions from the action space Ay : {-1,0,1}. When its new price is exposed to the environment in time slot ( t + l), the agent receives a reinforcement of
by the end of that slot. The objective of the agent is to obtain an optimal decision policy {P(Aplbd(t))}, so that Before deploying the Dyna-Q algorithm, there are a few outstanding problems that we need to address. 
1) Dividing the

B. Determining optimal lraansmission throiighput
In addition to evaluating each upstream candidate in terms of its induced utility, a downstream node i also computes the most preferable receiving throughput from the candidate, by maximizing Eq. 
C. Rate negotiation
Since delivering flows incurs empirical loss to the upstream node, it might be possible, especially when the transmission price is low, that node j ' s utility at time slot t becomes negative, if it delivers a flow to node i at rate
To address this problem, we introduce a two-step rate negotiation mechanism to determine the bandwidth allocated to an one-hop flow. Since downstream nodes are the primary decision makers regarding one-hop flowst we require node j to first compute the range of its acceptable transmission rates In summary, we have designed a market-based mechanism, which encourages selfish nodes to contribute their spare bandwidth and prevents them from excessively consuming bandwidth at other nodes by means of transmission prices. Two properties of the mechanism help to provide high-performance bandwidth allocation: ( I ) upstream nodes have the capability to wisely control their revenue and residual bandwidth using their prices; and (2) downstream nodes aim to maximize their private utility by receiving data from nodes that have both high residual bandwidth and low price.
We should point out that our proposed mechanism is not confined to any particular data disseminafion application.
Nodes may adjust their behavior in different applications at.
the same time, based on the same mechanism, as long as their selfishness about the bandwidth resource can be integrally characterized by the same utility function. We discuss outstanding issues with respect to the implementation of the proposed market mechanism as follows.
D. Price and bantlwidtli probing
As described above, a downstream node needs to probe each upstream candidate for its transmission price and acceptable transmission races, and measures the available bandwidth between the two. Practically, these two probing tasks can be combined in one step. Initially, the downstream node i sends a price probe (PP) message to each upstream candidate j , which contains the source node ID .i and the message ID (PP). Upon receiving the PP message, node j immediately returns four identical price repZy JPR) messages back-to-back. A PR message contains the source ID j , its transmission price, the current local time at node j , and its minimum and maximum acceptable transmission rates T:; and r$L. 
Price reply (PR)
Message bodv signed message, is able to decrypt it using the public key of node j and view the price: b i ? t j 2 j } p r i u j 4 (pj,tj,j). If it decides to take node j as its upstream node, node i sends to node j a stmf reqisest (SR) message that includes the following signed component: ((pj, t j , j ) , @ j . ti,j}r,riv,}privx. By decrypting the component, encrypting the first part (pj, t j , j ) using privj, and comparing the result with the second part, node j is able to verify that node i quoted an authentic price issued by itself when its local time was Ij. if the price is no older than one time slot, node j will proceed to transmit to node 1. and stil1 use the previous price; otherwise, it simply sends another set of PR messages, without starting the data transmission.
For convenience, Table I1 lists all' h e messages employed by our proposed mechanism, where nodes i and j are assumed to be a downstream and an upstream node, respectively.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Given the market-based mechanisms proposed in the paper, the question that remains to be answered is whether these iterative selfish decisions will lead to an overall outcome that is comparable to the situation that all nodes are responsibly maintaining the shared bandwidth resource. Our simulationbased results show the validity of the proposed mechanism, as well as its performance under various simulated scenarios. In particular, we show that the proposed mechanism is able to generate bandwidth allocations comparable to or better than cooperative situations.
A. Simulation methodulogy
In our simulations, topologies of the underlying backbone IP-layer network are randomly generated by the B R I E universal topology generator [26] , and overlay nodes are randomly connected to backbone routers in the IP network through last-mile access links. In all our experiments, the backbone IP network consists of 512 routers and 1024 backbone links. Capacities of the backbone links follow a heavy-tailed distribution between 10Mb-p~ and IO24Mbps. The bandwidth capacities of the lusr-mile links were exponentially distributed with an expectation of 10Mbp.s. The overlay network contains 256 overlay nodes. We model background traffic as random noise that is independently generated for each link, with the magnitude uniformly distributed from 0 to a small value, e.g. ~ 5% of the link capacity. The widest routing algorithm is used to select a IP-layer path of the highest bandwidth between two overlay nodes.
In the overlay application being simulated, overlay nodes query for Iarge data items, then directly downIoad from the upstream node that it has selected. While downloading a data item, a node probes all eligible upstream candidates every 50 time slots, and attempts to switch to another upstream node if it helps to increase its utility.
2000 items of identical sizes (300 Mb) are randomly distributed among overlay nodes, each having 3 separate copies, Experiments were run for 4000 time slots, with each time slot interpreted as 3 seconds in reality. During the first half Pubj of simulation time, overlay nodes sequentially establish data transmissions in randomly chosen time slots. At any time, a node may request for a data item with probability X = 0.1.
We assume service discovery mechanisms exist, such that a downstream node is able to locate all the upstream nodes that can provide the requested item. All nodes are assumed to be stateless, i.e., we do not consider the case where nodes cache downloaded copies and become eligible upstream candidates in the future.
For fair comparisons, we seek to keep the simulation environment consistent across differenl schemes under investigation. Our simulation environment inciude the physical network topology. the assignment of link capacities, background traffic, as well as events of node participation and downloading requests.
In our market-driven bandwidth allocation mechanism (referred to as niarket in simulation results), upstream nodes update Q-values every 20 steps, coefficients 61 and tl are set to 300G and 0.SCi. respectively, where Ci is the bandwidth capacity of node i. Transmission prices are initialized to 5.
B. Strategies used in comparisons
To be used as control in our comparisons, we have implemented four other fully decentralized strategies that determine the bandwidth allocations for one-hop flows.
-The GreedyCoop strategy. In this strategy, a downstream node greedily chooses the upstream node chat can deliver the data item at the highest throughput, which is the availabte bandwidth between the selected upstream node and itself. In GreedyCoop, the downstream nodes are greedy to exploit availabfe resources, but the upstream nodes always choose to be cooperative, and to provide the requested data item.
-The GreedySelf strategy. In this strategy, the downstream node is still greedy, but the selected upstream node may choose to deny the request for service at a particular transmission rate with a probability 7, which represents the degree of selfishness at the upstream node. In all these strategies, a downstream node may switch to a different upsueam node if it perceives a higher receiving throughput from the new upstream.
C. Evaluation melrics and sirnulation resulrs
For applications involving one-hop overlay data transmissions, we are most concerned with the total end-to-end throughput of the entire overlay, how many transmission requests can be successfully handled, and bandwidth utilization.
1) Total end-to-end tlirouglzpur:
We first analyze the total end-to-end throughput of all active one-hop Bows in the overlay with the market-based bandwidth allocation mechanism, as compared to the other decentralized strategies. As shown in Fig. 3 , as time progresses. total throughput rises initially in all h e strategies. and then stabilizes as all the nodes have joined the overlay. The GreedCoup strategy leads to the highest total end-to-end throughput due to the greedy nature of downstream nodes and the altruistic nature of the upstream, which can be treated as the ideal case when evaluating total end-to-end throughput. In contrast, the GreedySelf strategy emulates an unregulated selfish network. When the degree of selfishness at upstream nodes is moderate (7 = 0.51, its total throughput is slightly below the market-based mechanism. We have also tested the GreedySelf strategy with other T values. As intuitively expected. lower 7 values (less than 0.5. not shown) lead to a total end-to-end throughput very similar to the GreedyCoop strategy. and higher 7 values (> 0.5) will produce significantly worse total throughput. The Coopcoup strategy emulates a cooperative overlay, and the result is slightly higher than the market-based mechanism. With T = 0.5, the total end-to-end throughput with the Coopself strategy is evidently lower than that of the other strategies. From these resulrs, we observe that the total throughput of proposed market-based mechanism approaches the ideal case of GreedyCoop. and matches or exceeds the throughput achieved by cooperative strategies. 2) Percentages of rejected requests: The percentage of rejected requests in all transmission requests also reflects the capability of a strategy to utilize available resources in the overlay. In our experiment, a request is considered EO be rejected by the overlay, if the downstream can not find any upstream nodes from which it may download the requested data item. In our market-based mechanism, this may occur when the available bandwidth is low or when the prices are high. In the GreedvSelf strategy, such denied requests are due to the selfishness of upstream nodes. In CoopCoop, the reason may be that the available bandwidth to the downstream node is lower than the minimum threshold. In CooPSelf, either of the above two reasons can lead to denied requests. For simplicity, in GreedsSelj and CoopSelf strategies, a request is considered rejected when the best upstream candidate denies the request. Fig. 4(A)-(E) show that all other strategies stabilizes to a similar mean percentage of rejected requests -around 45%. while the market-based mechanism stabilizes to around 30%. This is a very desirable property. It indicates that under the market-based mechanism. downstream and upstream nodes are more likely to be able to manage one-hop flows between them according to their needs. In Fig. 4, 
Downloading time disrribulion:
For successfully downloaded items, we record the total downloading time for each item, and plot the cumulative density functions for all strategies in the comparison, as shown in Fig. 6 . We have found that the GreedyCoop, GreedySelf (with 7 = 0.5) and CoopSelf perform similarly, the market-based mechanism has the lowest average downloading time. and CoopCoop has the highest. Combined with previous figures, our results so far indicate that our market-based mechanism delivers comparable or superior performance compared to the cooperative strategies. Fig. 7 shows the bandwidth utilization as a percentage of utilizing last-mile access link capacities at each of the overlay nodes, and Table  111 lists bandwidth utilization averaged over all overlay nodes, obtained after 5 rounds of simulations.
) Bandwidth urilization on lust mile links:
We observe that in all strategies except CaopSelf(with T = 0.5), bandwidth utilization is quite high. mostly ranging from 50% to 100%. GreedyCoop and CoopCoop have the highest overall bandwidth utilization, due to the cooperative nature of upstream nodes. Our market-based mechanism performs similarly to the Greed-ySelf strategy. resulting transmission prices in our market-based mechanism.
In our simulations, we have carefully chosen the number of discrete states (mb), learning rate (fi in Eq, (2) ), number of hypothetical iterations (k], and a in Boltzmann distribution, in order to achieve fast convergence and reasonable range of prices. We use the following figures to show the effects of parameter settings, with nab = 5, = 0.5, and 3' = 0.9.
Fig. S has shown Q-value curves corresponding to all the state-action pairs at an arbitrary node that joins the transmissions at around 1200 seconds after the simulation starts. The number of hypothetical iterations, I;, is equal to 5 in Fig. 8(A) , and it is 15 in Fig. 8(B) . The figures show that Q-values converge quickly after 6000 seconds from the starting point of the simulation, while the learning curves with 15 hypothetical iterations change more sharply. (Fig. 8(C) ) and 0.01 (Fig, X(D) ), respectively. As shown in Fig. 9 , the transmission price mostly stays on a positive level when cr = 0.01, while frequently touching 0 when a = 0.001. This is because a very small a offers 
6)
Message overhead: Since a downstream node only needs to send its PP message to a few candidate nodes when it is in need of some data, and each candidate only replies 4 back to back messages, the total number of messages sent in a network increases linearly wilh the number of overlay nodes and is quite moderate.
To summarize, our simulation resuIts have clearly shown the advantages of our proposed market-based mechanisms as compared to other strategies with different degrees of selfishness. It is also clear that, using reinforcement Learning, upstream nodes can efficiently adjust their behavior under system dynamics. For example, learning can be performed while nodes dynamically join the overlay, which gradually leads to better performance. Further, the market-based mechanism leads to a total end-to-end throughput comparable to the Greed;vCuop strategy, the number of active flows comparable to the CoupCoop strategy, as well as the lowest percentage of rejected requests. These results have supported our claim that the market-based mechanism has achieved desirable systemwide properties with respect to bandwidth allocation in selfish overlay networks.
VII. C o N C L U s I o N s
In this paper, we have addressed the problem of bandwidth allocation in overlay networks comprised of selfish nodes, and designed a market-based mechanism that consists of a pricing game and local utility optimizations at downstream and upstream nodes. We propose distributed solutions that feasibly solve the pricing game, and discuss the local decision problems regarding each one-hop Bow. The highlights of this paper are as follows. First, the selfish behavior of overlay nodes is modeled as local maximization. With adequate pricing mechanisms. upstream nodes are obliged to contribute their bandwidth as much as possible, while maintaining sufficient residual bandwidth at the same time; downstream nodes are forced to consume bandwidth wisely, while maintaining a certain level of empirical benefits. Second, we inuoduce the learning cupabilio to overlay nodes, so that they are able to infer the dynamics of the external environment, and to act adaptively and optimally. We believe that the general service provisioning framework used in this paper can be utilized to solve other similar problems that involve the provisioning of services in dynamic settings.
